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In April 2019, an international group of scholars and practitioners met in Canberra, Australia, to 
discuss the practical, legal, ethical, and operational considerations presented by lethal autonomous 
weapons systems (LAWS).  Inspired by the Montreux Document, the Group has sought to articulate 
guiding principles on the use of LAWS without taking a position on broader questions of the 
legitimacy and advisability of their use. The Group is not affiliated with any State and the work is 
independent of any official position. This is a consultation document and the principles it sets out 
represent a starting point for further development. 
 
 
 
 2 
 
Steering Group 
 
Deane-Peter Baker 
Erin Hahn 
Peter Lee 
Ian MacLeod 
 
 
Other Members 
 
Liran Antebi 
Mark Hilborne 
Rain Liivoja 
Robert McLaughlin 
Valerie Morkevicius 
Shashank Reddy 
Mathew Wann 
 
Contact 
Deane-Peter Baker (d.baker@adfa.edu.au) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3 
 
Guiding Principles for the Development and Use of LAWS 
 
The advent of lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS) presents States with new political, 
technological, operational, legal and ethical challenges. This paper addresses these various 
challenges within defined parameters. The principles set out below are framed by the assumptions 
that underpin IHL and ethics of war traditions, which accept that war is sometimes necessary and 
can be just, but should be restrained in its practice. It is acknowledged from the outset that there is 
not the scope here to provide a comprehensive response to every issue raised by LAWS. Inspired by 
the Montreux Document, the goal here is to provide guiding principles for the development and use 
of LAWS without taking a position on the broader political and philosophical questions of 
acceptability of developing and using autonomous weapons.   
 
Principle 1. International Humanitarian Law (IHL) Applies to LAWS 
 
There is agreement among States Parties that IHL applies to the development and use of LAWS. The 
key principles of IHL, including military necessity, humanity, distinction and proportionality, apply 
regardless of the type of armed conflict. Several States have domestic policies reaffirming this point.  
This commitment to IHL principles is key to the development and employment of LAWS. 
Responsibility for compliance with IHL remains with human operators and cannot be delegated to 
technology.  Therefore, LAWS must be designed so they can be operated in a way that carries out 
commander’s intent.  
  
Principle 2.  Humans are Responsible for the Employment of LAWS 
 
Responsibility for compliance with IHL remains with humans.  It is above all vested in operators who 
employ weapons and is discharged through the military chain of command. Responsibility for the 
effects (i.e. damage or injury) caused by LAWS cannot be delegated to technology.  
Weapons or weapons systems, even those which incorporate autonomy, are not legal or moral 
agents. Machines, even complex ones, such as adaptive self-learning systems, cannot make ethical 
choices, they can only function in accordance with their programming. It is therefore erroneous to 
speak of delegating (either legal or moral) responsibility to autonomous weapons or 
autonomous weapons systems. Human agents retain responsibility for the intended effects and 
unintended but foreseeable effects caused by LAWS. 
 
Principle 3. The Principle of Reasonable Foreseeability Applies to LAWS 
 
War has always been characterized by an inability to anticipate and prevent every negative 
outcome. From the challenge of applying Rules of Engagement in complex, uncertain and dynamic 
environments, to mechanical failures of weapons and munitions, the principle of reasonable 
foreseeability has shaped human judgements and actions in war. This principle extends to 
judgements and actions in the development and deployment of LAWS, including individual and 
command responsibility. As a matter of law, parties to an armed conflict are required to account for 
the reasonably foreseeable reverberating effects of an attack, particularly for assessments of 
proportionality and precautions in attack. See Appendix for an example on the authorisation of 
LAWS for deployment. 
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Principle 4.  Use of LAWS Should Enhance Control over Desired Outcomes 
Militaries pursue advances in technology to achieve advantage over likely adversaries. This 
advantage can come in many forms, but can be broadly categorized into enhancing existing 
capabilities or developing entirely new capabilities.  Pursuit of autonomous capability within 
weapon systems should be motivated by the desire to achieve at least the same or better quality of 
decision-making at a more rapid pace, or to achieve a desired outcome when other forms of control 
are denied. In both cases, autonomous capability should enable greater control over the desired 
outcome.  
Principle 5. Command and Control Accountability Applies to LAWS 
Military command and control (C2) is the means by which states control the use of force while 
complying with their legal obligations and respecting ethical values. Militaries have established C2 
procedures, which are fundamental to how they function. Effective C2 enables compliance with IHL. 
Introducing LAWS into military forces must be done in a way that is coherent with C2 paradigms.   
Principle 6.  Appropriate Use of LAWS is Context Dependent  
 
Consistent with other weapon systems, the use of LAWS must be constrained by a) the operational 
context, and b) the specific capabilities and limitations of the weapon or weapon system in question. 
IHL requires that military forces take feasible precautions to minimize incidental loss of life to 
civilians and damage to civilian objects and prohibits any attack which may be expected to cause 
excessive collateral damage. Generally, the greater the risk in this regard in any particular context, 
the higher the level of command authorization required. Figure 1 below shows this relationship. 
 
 
Figure 1 Risk and Decision Making Authority in Military Conflict 
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Related to this is the impact of the passage of time. Generally, the greater the risk of harm, the 
greater the requirement for more immediate command authorization. The duration of autonomous 
function must be limited within parameters which keeps the level of risk below the 'reasonable 
foreseeability' threshold. The duration of appropriate autonomous function in the environment in 
question will depend on the specific capabilities and limitations of the weapon or weapons system 
in question, as well as military necessity.  
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APPENDIX  
  
Military autonomous aircraft pre-flight checks and authorisation 
 
The employment of LAWS is conceptualised here by showing the continuity in system reliance and 
control measures between conventional bomber aircraft and remotely piloted aircraft. From this 
starting point the practicalities are set out to show how a future variant might operate when 
elements of its functionality are autonomous.  
 
The following table sets out key elements of the pre-flight checks conducted prior to a typical 
mission by a military bomber aircraft (left column). Parallel principles and authorisations are shown 
for a military remotely piloted aircraft (centre column), then extended to set out the anticipated 
checks for an autonomous variant of the same aircraft. It illustrates the processes employed to 
ensure reasonable foreseeability of system safety and mission effectiveness. Several states that 
operate conventional and RPA use the same control procedures for both. While we do not yet know 
the specific requirements for an autonomous variant, historical experience with the introduction of 
new technology indicates it is likely the essential system and mission checks will remain the same, 
with incremental modifications. 
 
 
Conventional military bomber aircraft 
pre-flight checks, authorisations and 
‘sign-out’ 
Military RPA pre-flight checks, 
authorisations and ‘sign-out’ 
Military autonomous aircraft pre-flight 
checks, authorisations and ‘sign-out’ 
System 
 Engine serviceability and service 
record 
 Fuel status 
 Airframe serviceability 
 Avionics 
 Sensor systems (including cameras) 
 Communications systems 
 Control systems 
 Navigation systems 
 IT updates confirmed 
 
Mission 
 Weapon payload 
 Meteorology report for operational 
area 
 Operations Intelligence update  
 Aircraft tasking (ISR/ weapon strike) 
 Special instructions (warnings 
about other aircraft activities in the 
area) 
 Aircraft ‘signed out’ to the Captain 
(pilot) by the Authorising Officer 
 Crew walks to the aircraft 
 
System 
 Engine serviceability and service 
record 
 Fuel status 
 Airframe serviceability 
 Avionics 
 Sensor systems (including cameras) 
 Communications systems 
 Control systems 
 Navigation systems 
 IT updates confirmed 
 
Mission 
 Weapon payload 
 Meteorology report for operational 
area 
 Operations Intelligence update  
 Aircraft tasking (ISR/ weapon strike) 
 Special instructions (warnings 
about other aircraft activities in the 
area) 
 Aircraft ‘signed out’ to the Captain 
(pilot) by the Authorising Officer 
 Crew walks to the Ground Control 
Station 
 
System 
 Engine serviceability and service 
record 
 Fuel status 
 Airframe serviceability 
 Avionics 
 Sensor systems (including cameras) 
 Communications systems 
 Control systems 
 Navigation systems 
 IT updates confirmed 
 
Mission 
 Weapon payload 
 Meteorology report for operational 
area 
 Operations Intelligence update  
 Aircraft tasking (ISR/ weapon strike) 
 Special instructions (warnings about 
other aircraft activities in the area) 
 Operation parameters programmed 
into operating system, incorporating 
engagement criteria 
 System backups confirmed 
 Aircraft ‘signed out’ by the 
Authorising Officer (who is 
responsible for ensuring that all of the 
above checks and procedures have 
been carried out prior to deployment) 
 
 
  
